2. Foreign policy and the military regime in Brazil - doctrines and actors 2.1. The military and the National Security Doctrine 2.1.1. The NSD's main external premises 2.1.2. The "deinification" of the NSD 2.2. Decision making arena - the president, the militry and the foreign ministry 2.2.1. The presidency: Ernesto Geisel's policy-making system and management style 2.2.2. The inner circle 2.2.3 The outer circle 2.3. Conclusion 2.4. Appendix I 3. The Foreign Policy of "Responsible Pragmatism" 3.1. New International Order and Foreign Policy changes 3.2. Political and economic aspects of Geisel's government 3.3. The foreign Policy of "Responsible Pragmatism" 3.4. conclusion 3.5. Appendix II 4. Brazilian policy towards Cuba (1964-1975) 4.1. Brazil's civilain governments assess the Castro regime 4.2. The Brazilian military regime and the Cuban question 4.3. The requirements for a change 4.4. Setting the scene for Geisel’s stance towards Cuba 4.4.1. Brazil-Latina America 4.4.2. Brazil-US 4.5. Cuba and the Inter-American System – defining means and ends 4.6. The process of decision-making 4.6.1. Brazil identifies and wheits its alternatives (XV Meeting of Consultation) 4.6.2. Not much to choose 4.6.3. Brazil explains its position 4.6.4. Brazil holds to its decision (XVI Meetings of Consultation) 4.7. Conclusion 4.8. Appendix III 5. The resumption of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China 5.1. Historical background (1949-1969) 5.2. Beijing and the international relations in the 1970s 5.3. Brazil and cina in the 1970s 5.4. On the direction of a change 5.5. The momento of decision 5.6. Consensus building 5.7. Conclusion 5.8. Appendix IV 6. The recognition of Angolan independence 6.1. Brazilian foreign policy towards African colonialism – a historial perspective, 1964-1974 6.2. Changing course – Brazilian pragmatic policy towards African colonialism 6.3. Brazil defines its position towards Angola: “to the winner, the potatoes” 6.4. The wighing up of costs and benefits 6.5. Brazil honors its words: the recognition of Angolan independence 6.6. the impact of the decision 6.7. The lesser of two evils: pondering alternatives 6.8. Adhering to the decision despite negative feedback 6.9. Cnclusion 6.10. Appendix V